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1 Introduction
A Dutch book is a gamble which is sure to lose and a Dutch book argument is an argument 
of the following general form. 
A rational individual must behave in accordance with precept X, for if they
_______ _uduo_,n11ollt�, _a.an_outsider_wiJLbe-able_io_gain__a_finandaLad=ntage_fro=-her;__ ________ _ 
Dutch book arguments are often at the core of normative arguments for behaving in 
accordance with expected utility theory. It is our thesis that such Dutch book arguments 
while logically and mathematically correct, cannot be used to deduce the properties 
of subjective probability. We illustrate our point by concentrating on a Dutch book 
argument due to deFinetti which is generally construed as requiring rational individuals 
to have subjective probabilities regarding uncertain events. That is, it is argued that it is 
irrational to have subjective beliefs about the likelihood of events that are not consistent 
with some probability measure. 
DeFinetti's argument runs like this. (See [2] . )  
Let us suppose that an individual is  obliged to evaluate the rate p at which 
he would be ready to exchange the possession of an arbitrary sum S (positive 
or negative) dependent on the occurrence of a given event E, for the possession
of the sum pS; we will say by definition that this number p is the measure of 
the degree of probability attributed by the individual considered to the event 
E, or, more simply, that pis the probability of E (according to the individual
considered; this specification can be implicit if there is no ambiguity. )1 
*Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech
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1[2, p. 62.] 
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He then goes on to define probability assessments as being coherent if it is not possible 
to bet with the subject in such a way as to be assured of gaining, and argues that it is 
precisely this condition of coherence which constitutes the sole principle 
from which one can deduce the whole calculus of probability: this calculus 
then appears as a set of rules to which the subjective evaluation of probability 
of various events by the same individual ought to conform if there is not to be 
a fundamental contradiction among them.2 
While deFinetti refers to the exchange rate p as the individual's probability of the event 
E, we will use the more noncommittal term price. That is, the individual, henceforth
called the Bookie, agrees to take bets on or against E at the same rate p.
Given a collection E1, • • • , En of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events, if their
prices p1, · · · ,pn are nonnegative and sum to unity, they define a probability measure 
on the events. What deFinetti proved is that either the p's are nonnegative and sum 
to unity (and hence determine a probability) or the p(s are incoherent, meaning it is 
possible to make a combination of bets which guarantee that the bettor makes a profit. 
These possibilities are mutually exclusive. While deFinetti in his comments indicates 
that he does not mean the term "incoherent" in a pejorative sense, the implication is 
clear cut. This is a Dutch book argument in one of its starkest forms. 
We are not interested in what deFinetti said per se, rather we are interested in the 
validity of this mode of argument, and deFinetti's is one of the most unambiguous state­
ments of this approach. 
There are two fundamental questions to examine in regard to Dutch book arguments of 
this type. One is whether we can interpret a bookie's prices as her probabilities, the other 
is whether a rational bookie will set prices consistent with any probabilities. Another 
way to ask the question is, to what extent can we deduce the calculus of probability form 
the postulate of rational behavior? 
We begin by describing the logic of a typical Dutch book argument in favor of additive 
pnces. 
Let A and B be two mutually exclusive events, and assume that the decision maker's 
subjective probabilities for the events A, B, and AUE are p, q, and r respectively, where 
p + q =Ir, say p + q < r. Offer him now the following lotteries. First, pay him p dollars 
for a bet on A. If A occurs he will pay one dollar (thus his net income is p -1 dollars) , 
and if A does not occur, he will keep the p dollars. The expected gain from this lottery,
according to the subject's beliefs, is zero. Of course, a risk averse decision maker will 
refuse to participate in such a game. Nevertheless, if we replace dollars by cents (or tenth 
on cents, etc.) ,  and we offer to pay him p + E:, E: < r - p- q, rather than p, then for a 
2[2, p. 63.]
2 
sufficiently small gamble the decision maker will overcome his risk aversion and agree to 
the above mentioned terms. 
Similarly, he will accept an offer of q + E: on B, which requires him to pay one dollar in 
case that B happens. Finally, he is also willing to pay r - E: dollars for a gamble on the 
event AU B, provided he wins one dollar in case the event "A or B" happens. If either
A or B happens, he wins one dollar, but must also pay a dollar. He received p + q + 2c 
and paid r - E: for these lotteries, hence his net gain is p + q - r + E: < 0. Note that 
this procedure involves no uncertainty, and the decision maker will thus lose the above 
difference with certainty. Such a mechanism is a Dutch book. 
Several assumptions are implicit in the above discussion. The assumption that the 
gambles are small was already introduced by deFinetti himself, to overcome the issue of 
diminishing utility of money. (But see [2, fn. a., p. 62. ] .) Nevertheless, the assumption
that for a small risk the decision maker comes as close as we wish to risk neutrality 
does not hold true even within expected utility theory, where it is equivalent to the 
assumption that the utility function is differentiable [11, fn. 6]. The risk neutrality 
assumption certainly does not always hold in nonexpected utility models. (See [15] for a
general discussion of risk aversion with respect to small risks) . However, it is still true
that if the decision maker is willing to accept and to buy bets at nonadditive rates, then 
he will be vulnerable to a Dutch book. Indeed, Samuelson's comment may prove that 
the decision maker does not announce his true beliefs whenever his utility function is 
_____ _u_uounud1u"fE1.eer.entiahle,buLrwnadditi¥e.l"ates-stilLexpose-1ri=-to-the-danger--0Li.-Duw· ::.t1.-lJO;()K. _____ _ 
In this paper we point out an overlooked element in the traditional analysis. Namely 
that the bookie and any potential bettors are playing a game against each other, and the 
bookie's prices and the bettors' bets are strategic choices. It is thus necessary to analyze 
the equilibrium of this game in order to draw any conclusion about the relationship be­
tween the bookie's prices and her beliefs. Since the bookie moves first and sets her prices, 
the bettor cannot influence the prices. That is, the appropriate equilibrium concept is 
subgame perfect equilibrium. Each set of prices for bets constitutes an information set 
for the bettors, so a strategy for a bettor is a function mapping prices into bets. Subgame 
perfection requires that these bets maximize the bettor's payoff, however he chooses to 
evaluate it. Given the bettors' strategy functions, the bookie chooses prices to maximize 
her payoff given the bets that will actually be placed. 
If, as is typically the case in game theoretic models, the bookie is cognizant of the 
payoffs of the bettors, (or at least of how Nature chooses the bettors) , the relevant
consideration is how these bettors will respond. That is, the prices set by the bookie 
reflect not only her own beliefs, but also the bettors' beliefs. In fact, as Corollary 5 below 
shows, the bookie's prices may reflect only the beliefs of the bettors.
This is obviously true of professional bookies. Their prices are designed to equate the 
supply and demand of bets, and so reflect the bookies' beliefs about the bettor's beliefs, 
not about the events. Professional bookies also set nonadditive prices because they take 
a percentage off the top and will not let the bettors take either side of a bet at a given 
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price. Dutch book arguments only address themselves to the case where the bookie must 
take both sides of a bet at the same price. In the expected value case with one bettor, 
such bookie's rates are at least additive. But this result fails more generally. 
In this paper we show, by means of an example, that it may indeed happen that 
the bookie's optimal strategy is to announce nonadditive prices. For this, we have to 
assume that the bettors are nonexpected utility maximizers. The bookie herself evaluates 
uncertain prospects by their expected utility. (This utility function can be chosen to be 
differentiable, so that all of deFinetti's requirements are satisfied.) In this setting we 
construct a game with a subgame perfect equilibrium with nonadditive prices. It is true 
that at these prices, it is possible for a bettor to place a combination of bets that will 
guarantee that he wins, but for the bettors in the game that is not their best course 
of action. Consequently the bookie does not lose for sure, and in fact, has a higher 
expected utility from these bets than from not participating at all. In later sections 
we examine Dutch books arguments in favor of the rule of conditional probability, i.e.,
P(A n B) = P(A)P(BIA), and Bayes' rule. We find that the validity of these arguments
also depend on the assumption that the bookie does not behave strategically. 
2 The game
There are disjoint events A and B which exhaust the set of possible states. That is, A,
B, AU B, and ¢ are the only events under consideration. The bookie posts prices a and
b for bets on A and B respectively. If a bettor buys $x of the bet on A his net proceeds
are $(:'.-x) if A occurs and -$x if B occurs. The bookie must both buy and sell bets at
a 
the posted prices. Table 1 summarizes the bettor's monetary payoffs from various bets.
Observe that selling x is the same as buying -x, so without loss of generality we shall
consider the bettors' purchases, which may be negative. 
Bettor's Action Net Payoff on A Net Payoff on B
Buy x on A and buy y on B x/a-x-y y/b-x-y
Buy x on A and sell y on B y-x+x/a y-x-y/b
Sell x on A and buy y on B x-y-x/a x-y+y/b
Sell x on A and sell y on B x+y-x/a x+y-y/b
Table 1: Bettor's Monetary Payoffs from Combinations of Bets 
We impose the following budget constraint on the bettors. Each bettor has only one 
dollar and is not permitted to buy on credit nor is he allowed to sell a bet (buy a negative 
quantity) unless he proves that he possesses sufficient funds to pay off in the event he 
loses. These funds cannot include possible gains from from some other bets.3 Formally, 
3Even in deFinetti 's analysis, it is impossible to let the bettor use this potential revenue for further 
betting (thus creating a money pump), because the bookie will refuse to let him bet with her money. 
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we can write his budget constraint as 
a b 
x+ + y+ + x- --+ y---
b 
� 1.
1-a 1-
where, as usual, x+ denotes max{ x, O} and x- denotes max{ -x, O}.
The following lemma guarantees that without loss of generality the bookie need only 
consider prices a and b satisfying a + b � 1. It applies to any bettor whose preferences
are monotone with respect to first order stochastic dominance. Its proof is omitted. 
Lemma 1 Assume the bettor's preferences over lotteries are monotone. If a+ b < 1,
then the bettor's optimal bets satisfy x 2': 0 and y 2': 0. If a+ b > 1, then the bettor's
optimal bets satisfy x � 0 and y � 0.
For the remainder of our results, the bettors are assumed to evaluate lotteries using an 
anticipated utility functional. That is, there is a utility function u and a rank-dependent
probability weighting function g : [O, 1] --> [O, 1 ] ,  strictly increasing and satisfying g(O) = 0
and g ( l) = 1, which determine the value of a lottery. (See [1, 9, 13, 18].) The formula
for the value of a lottery with (subjective) distribution function F is
V(F) = { u(w) d(g o F)(w) .
• 
For a random variable taking on only two values, v < w, with probabilities q and 1 - q,
the formula for the value reduces to 
V(v, q; w, 1- q) = u(v)g(q) + u(w) (1 - g(q)). (1) 
We also assume that the probability weighting function g is concave.
We can now evaluate the bettor's choices. Let q denote the bettor's subjective prob­
ability of A. Given the prices a and b, the bettor's values are given in Table 2. The next
Bettor's Value 
g(q)u �-x - y  +(l- g(q))u �- x -y
(1 - g(l - q)) u '!'.. -x - y + g(l - q)u '!!. - x - y
a b 
x 
u -- x -y =u
a 
Table 2: Bettor's Values from Purchases of Bets x on A and y on B
lemma depends on the bettor's evaluating lotteries using an anticipated utility functional 
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and greatly simplifies the analysis of the bettor's best response behavior. It states that 
if a + b ::; 1, then the bettor will either plunge by betting everything on A or on B or
else hedge by betting so as to receive the same payoff in either event. (Remember that
if a + b < 1, then this payoff will be strictly positive. ) The reason for this is that if
a+ b ::; 1 and the bettor chooses x and y to satisfy � < �' then he becomes better off
by increasing y up to y = 1. Similarly if he chooses to set � > �, he should set x = 1,
. x y a b . and 1f he chooses to set - = -
b
, then he should set x = --
b 
and y = --
b
. Agam the
a a+ a+ 
proof is straightforward. 
Lemma 2 If u is convex and g is concave, and if a+ b ::; 1, then the bettor's optimal
response is to Plunge on A, Plunge on B, or Hedge. The payoffs are given in Table 3.
Action Bettor's value 
Plunge on A u(-l)g(l -q) + u 1-a (l-g(l-q))--
n. 
Plunge on B u(-l)g(q)+ u 1-b (1 -g(q))
b
Hede:e 
l-a -b
u 
a -t---fi 
Table 3: 
His optimal strategy depends on which of these three options yields the highest utility. 
We start with the case of linear utility, u( x) = x.
Define the parameters 
and 
Since g is concave, a � (3.
g(l -q) 
a = ---'-'--�=--� 
1 -g(l -q) 
(3 = 
1 -g(q)
. 
g(q) 
Proposition 3 If the bettor's utility Junction u is linear and his probability transforma­
tion function g is concave, then the his optimal strategies are:
b 
e Plunge on L1 whenever - � o:;
a 
b 
• Plunge on B whenever - ::; (3;
a 
6 
b Plunge on A
Hedge 
Plunge on B 
Figure 1: Bettor's optimal response (Linear utility) 
b 
• Hedge whenever f3:::; - :::; a.
a 
1 'hese strategies are depicted in Figure 1.
Note that when g is linear, that is, when the bettor is risk neutral, a = f3 and he
will buy either on A or on B, but not on both, unless � = a = (3, in which case he is
a 
indifferent between all three strategies. 
It follows from Proposition 3 that if the bettor's utility function is linear, but his 
probability transformation function is concave, then his optimal strategy depends only 
b
on the ratio -. Since the bettor is buying bets, the bookie always prefers, for a given 
a
strategy of the bettor, to set the prices a and b as high as possible. Thus if a+ b < 1 it
pays to raise both proportionately. We thus get the following result. 
Theorem 4 If all bettors maximize an anticipated utility functional with a linear utility
function and concave probability transformation Junction, and the bookie's preferences
are monotone, then the bookie's equilibrium strategy requires a+ b = 1.
Corollary 5 If g is linear, i.e., the bettor is an expected value maximizer, then the
equilibrium strategy of the bookie is to set a = q and b = 1 - q.
That is the bookie's prices are the bettor's subjective probabilities, not her own! 
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Note that the theorem remains true even when the bettors are risk loving (i.e., when 
the function g is convex and a S /3).
Theorem 4 holds whenever there is just one bettor whose preferences exhibit diversi­
fication. Suppose that there are s1, ... , Sm states of the world, and let X1, ... , Xn by n 
random variables. For a = ( a1, ... , an) E R';. such that L: °'i = 1, let X (a) be the ran­
dom variable yielding L:i=i aiXi(s;) if the state of the world is s;. The decision maker's
preferences exhibit diversification if X1 � · • · � Xn implies that X(a) >--Xi for every a 
and i. 
Diversification implies, but is not implied, by risk aversion. However, risk aversion 
and quasiconcavity of the preference relation imply diversification. (See [3]). 
Theorem 6 Suppose that the bookie's preferences are monotonic. If there is just one
bettor and his preference relation exhibits diversification, then the bookie's equilibrium
strategy satisfies a + b = 1.
Proof: It is always optimal for the bettor to spend the whole dollar. Note that when the
rates on A and B are a and b, respectively, then betting ax
b 
on A and bx
b 
on B adds
a+ a+
1 -a -b
x to the bettors income and so is desired by first order stochastic dominance. 
Suppose that when the rates are a and b with a + b < 1, the bettor plunges on A.
For every b' > b, the bettor will plunge on a, as long as a does not change. Indeed,
suppose that for (a, b') with b' > b the bettor buys x on A and 1 - x on B. He then
x 1 -x 
faces the lottery X = (- -1, A; --- 1, B), which he finds to be preferred to the
a b' 
lottery Y = (� - 1,A;-1,B). By first order stochastic dominance, the lottery Z = 
a 
(� - 1, A; 
1 
� 
x - 1, B) is better than X, and by transitivity it is preferred to Y, the
lottery he chose. In other words, the bookie might as well set a+b = 1. Similar arguments
hold when the bettor plunges on B. 
Suppose now that when the rates are a and b where a+ b < 1, the bettor mixes, and
buys x on A and 1 - x on B. By the same argument as before it follows that when
the rates are (a, 1 -a) he will not spend more than 1 - x on B, and when the rates
are (1 -b, b), he will not spend more than x on A. We want to show that for some
a'+ b' = 1, a' E [a , 1 -b], the bettor will mix ( x, 1 -x ), thus making the bookie better
off. Suppose that such a point does not exist. Let a' be the supremum of the numbers a"
(with corresponding points on the main diagonal) for which the bettor mixes (y, 1 -y),
where y :2'. y* > x. Also, as long a" :2'. a', the bettor hedges (z, 1 -z) where x S z* < x.
Suppose, without loss of generality that y* = inf {y} and z* = sup{ z}. Then at (a', 1 -a')
the bettor is indifferent between hedging y* on A and 1 -y* on B. By diversification, he
will prefer hedging with x* on A and a -x* on B. II
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Nonlinear utility 
Next we will show that this analysis may fail if there is more than one bettor and the 
bettors' utility functions are convex, but not linear. When facing two such bettors, the 
bookie's optimal strategy may be to set nonadditive rates, even when her own subjective 
probabilities are additive. 
We start with the analysis of a bettor's problem. Specifically, consider utilities for the 
bettors of the following form. 
{ ekx X > 0 u(x)= x+l x;:;o
For k :::: 1 this is a (weakly) convex increasing function. Set
s = -ln[l -g(l -q)]
and 
t = -ln[l - g(q)].
The parameters s and t depend only on the bettor's belief q and his preferences through
g. By appropriately choosing q we can make s and t arbitrarily large.
The equation of the set (a, b) pairs making the bettor indifferent between plunging on
�-----�A�a�nwdlLlllp unging_on_tLJ0[S_ ______________________________ _ 
b = 
a 
( )
1 -a 'r;' ·
2 
This curve is labeled "A vs. B" in Figure 2. It is convex ifs > t and concave ifs < t.
The equation of the (a, b) pairs for which plunging on A is indifferent to hedging is
given by 
a2.!!... b= k 
1-af
This curve is convex and intersects the line a+ b = l at the point a = _
k
_. 
s+k
(3) 
Finally, the locus of (a, b) pairs which the bettor indifferent between plunging on B
and hedging is 
b2l- k a - t. 1 - bk 
This curve intersects the a+ b = 1 line at a= _
t
_. 
k+t 
(4) 
Also note that the transitivity of indifference guarantees that if two these curves 
intersect; then all three of them intersect at the same point. 
Figure 2 depicts these loci for the case s = 1.8, t = 1.5, and k = 1. In the first
drawing, the curve labeled "A vs. H" is the locus of (a, b) pairs making plunging on A
9 
and hedging indifferent. the other curves are similarly labeled. The regions are labeled 
with the bettor's preferences. That is, in the region marked "AHB," the bettor prefers 
plunging on A to hedging to plunging on B. The second drawing indicates the bettor's 
best responses. 
" 
H 
B 
,., 0.0 ,• 
Figure 2: Bettor's choices 
We will assume that when the bettor is indifferent between plunging and hedging, the
bettor will plunge. (We are, by the usual rules of game theory, entitled to do this. ) Even
in this case, the logic that when the bettor is plunging, the bookie wants to raise the 
price of the bettor's bet and when he's hedging, the bookie wants to raise both prices, 
drives the equilibrium prices to satisfy a + b = 1.
This, however, is not necessarily the case when the bookie plays against more than
one bettor.
Suppose that there are two bettors, I and IL Their optimal strategies are indicated
in Figure 3. There are five points of special interest, labeled P, Q, R, S, and T in
Figure 3. Point Q has the largest a for which both bettors will plunge on A, and point
T has the largest b for which both bettors will plunge on B. At point R, Bettor I hedges
while II plunges on A. At S, I plunges on B, while II hedges. The segment joining
R and S has both bettors hedging. Finally at point P, Bettor I is plunging on B and
Bettor II is plunging on A. It is easy to see that the bookie's expected utility will be 
maximized at one of P, Q, T, or on the segment RS. Letting p denote the bookie's
subjective probability of A, her expected utilities are given in Table 4. It is possible to
choose values for p, s1, t1, k1, SII, tII, and kn, and a concave increasing utility u for the
bookie so th_a.t point P has the highest expected utilit�y. For instance, choose k1 = 2.857,
kn = 1, s1 = 28.57, t1 = 1, sn = 3, tu = 12 (these are the values used to plot Figure 3) 
10 
0,8 
0. 6 
0 .4 
II 
0" 0 .4 0. 6 0.8 
Figure 3: Two bettors
p pu ( 2 - �) + (1 - p)u ( 2 -TI 
Q 
:.:: 
+ (1 -p)u (2) pu 2-p-a 
R 1 +( l-p)u( l) pu 1- -a 
s pu( l)+(l-p)u 
l 1- - I b 
T pu(2) + (1-p)u 
:.:: 
2-- I b 
RS u(O) 
Table 4: Bookie's candidate strategies. 
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and p = .2. For the bookie's utility choose
u(x) = { �x+6 
x � -2 
x::::; -2.
Then to three decimal places, the bookie's expected utilities are given in Table 5. In the
Point (a, b) Expected utility
p ( .248,. 727) 0.080
Q (.091, .909) -13.200
R ( .250, . 750) -0.400
s ( .259,. 7 41) -0.215
T (.923, .077) -71.600
RS 0.000
Table 5: Bookie's candidate strategies: Numerical example.
equilibrium of this game the bookie does not post additive prices. 
To be fair, there is another equilibrium, where the bettors hedge when indifferent, 
in which the bookie posts additive prices and her expected value is zero. The point is 
that there is at least one equilibrium (in fact the bookie's favorite) in which she sets
nonadditive prices. 
When the bookie sets the rates a on A and b on B, she also sets the rate a+ b on
AU B. Indeed, a bettor may now bet _c:__
b 
on A and ___!!_
b 
on B, thus winning __.!:_
ba+ a+ a+ 
in case either A or B happen, which is, of course, the same as a bet of one dollar on
A U B when the rate on this event is a + b. It follows that in the above example the
bookie could have announced the rate a+ b on AU B, rather than the rate 1, but this
would not have changed the equilibrium strategies. Since AU B is the sure event, this 
by itself would probably have been considered by deFinetti as leading to an immediate 
Dutch book. Nevertheless, the major point of the section is established, as we show the 
existence of an equilibrium with nonadditive rates. 
3 Conditional probability
We now examine arguments regarding computation of conditional probabilities. Consider
the following two state process. At time 0, Nature chooses event A or Ac. If Ac occurs,
the game is over. If A occurs, then at time t = 1 Nature chooses B or Be. For example,
A may be the development of a new product, and B may be its success in the market. 
(See [10] for an experiment based on this interpretation.) Suppose a decision maker has
12
subjective probabilities p that A occurs at time 0, q that B occurs at time 1 given that
A has already occurred, and r that both A and B will occur. If r f pq, say r > pq, then
the following Dutch book is possible. 
At time 0, a bettor will bet $1 on A at the price p and sell the bookie a $1 bet on
1A n  B at the pricer. If A occurs, then the bettor wins$-, which at time 1 he bets on B p 
at the rate q. If B occurs, then the bettor nets $l - ! > 0. If Be occurs, then the bettorpq r 
breaks even, because he lost the proceeds from his $1 bet on A, but wins $1 from the bet
he sold on A n  B. Similarly, if Ac occurs, the bettor breaks even. Thus the bettor can
never lose, but can win. 4 
It turns out that this Dutch book too depends on the assumption that since there is a 
potential sure profit, someone will take it, regardless of any other available options. As 
is the case with the Dutch book against nonadditive probabilities, here too it is possible 
to find examples where the bookie's optimal strategy is to announce rates violating the 
rule of conditional probability. 
Assume one bookie and two bettors, all of whom maximize expected value. Let p;, q;, 
r;, i = 0, 1, 2, be the subjective probabilities the bookie (agent 0) and the two bettors 
(agents 1 and 2) assign to the events A, B, and A n B, respectively. Assume further that
p;q; = r; = r, i = 0, 1, 2. In other words, all three agents agree on the probability of the 
event A n  B, and all three of them satisfy the rule of conditional probability. 
If the bookie offers the rates a on A and b on B, then she also offers the rate of ab on
An B, as a bettor may put a dollar on A, and buy, in case he wins, a bet of � dollars
on B. Since all agents are risk neutral, and they all agree on the probability of the event
A n B, it follows that the bookie's expected gain from bets on A n B is never positive,
but if the bookie fixes the rate r on A n  B, the expected value of any bets on this event
is zero. If the bookie announces the rate c = r on A n B and finds it optimal to set
the rates a on A and b on B such that ab f r, then there is an optimal strategy for the
bookie at which ab# c, as switching from ab to r cannot make her worse off.
We start with an analysis of a bettor's optimal strategy. To simplify notation, we 
omit the index i. As before, his initial budget is one dollar. If a < p, he wants to buy one 
dollar on A, since such a bet has a positive expected return. This is the case regardless
of what he wants to do with respect to the event B. Of course, if A does not happen he
will not be able to play on B, but since he believes that the expected value of his budget,
after the uncertainty concerning the event A is resolved, is more than one, he will first
play on A. Upon winning, he will buy l/a on B if b < q, and sell �(1- b) on B if b > q.5
a 
Things are different when a > p. In this case the bettor wants to sell on A, but then 
he will not be able to buy or sell a.t. a later date on B. If A happens then he looses, and
4For another discussion of Dutch books and conditional probabilities, see (16]. 
5jf h h 1 . . X 1 1 e as - dollars, the maximal x he may sell on B satisfies x - - =-,hence x = -(1- b). 
a b a a 
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if A does not happen, he wins but B can no longer happen. Of course, if he plays on B, 
q-b b-q he will buy on B if b < q and sell if b > q. His expected returns are -
b
- and 
1 _ b'
respectively. On the other hand, if he sells _
a
_ on A, his expected return is a -p. 
1-a 1-a 
a-p q-b 1-a a-p b-q 
Obviously, -- 2 -- if and only if b 2 q--, and -- 2 --
b 
if and only if
1-a b 1 - b  1-a 1-
1-a 
b 2 1 -(1 -q)--.
1-p 
If the bettor buys x dollars on A, then the bookie's expected gain is x - xPo. If he
a 
sells x on A, then her expected gain is x�. Similar analysis holds for bets on B.
a-x 
If the bettor buys x on A and in case he wins he buys � on B, the bookie's utility is
a 
x -xp0 
qo b. If, after A happens, the bettor sells x�(l -b) on B, the bookie's utility is
a a 
x[l -p0 
1 -qo (1 -b)J. This discussion is summarized in Table 6.
a 
Note that since she is an expected value maximizer, the bookie's utility from a set 
of gambles is the sum of the utilities she receives from the gambles themselves. Let 
1 1 1 1 
d l A ' l  l ' f hPo= qo = 6' P1 = g' qi= 4' P2 = 2' an q2 18. numenca ana ys1s o t e 
bookie's oRtions implies that her optimal strate�is_t_Q_s_ej_a = 0 3_6_2,_b = QJ1!l�Cka,ll.)',__ _ _ _  _ 
1 
ab -
36 = 
0.037.
4 The Bayesian Bookie
The next "Dutch book" argument is weaker than the previous examples as it only shows 
that the bookie's expected return is negative, but it does not imply that she can never 
win. It concerns the incentives to use Bayes' rule. 
The following game is played. There are two urns indexed by {1,2}. Urn 1 has 10 
white balls and 20 black balls, and Urn 2 has 20 white balls and 10 black balls. The 
Master of Ceremonies (MC) secretly chooses an urn and draws a ball from it randomly.
He shows the ball to the Bookie and the Bettor. The Bookie then announces odds on 
which urn the MC used. The Bettor now bets on the urns. The MC then reveals which 
urn he used and the bet is settled as follows. When the Bookie posts odds of ,\ against 
Urn 2 and the Bettor bets s on Urn 2 and t against Urn 2, the Bettor receives ,\s -t if 
Urn 2 was the MC's choice and - s  + t if Urn 1 was the MC's choice.
A Bayesian bookie would use a prior probability q = (qi, q2) over the MC's choice of
urns and compute the following conditional probabilities. 
Prob(Urn ljWhite) =
14 
Case 
a :'::'. p, 
b::::: q 
a:'::'. p, 
b?. q 
a?. p,
l-a 
b>q--- 1-v 
a?. p,
l-a 
b<q--- 1-v 
a?. p, 
l-q b>l-(l-a)--- 1-v 
a?. p,
(1 -a) 
b q(l-p)::::: 
l-a 
b:';'. (l-q) -1 - j) 
Bettor's Optimal Strategy 
Buy 1 on A. If A happens, 
1 
then buy - on B. 
n 
Buy 1 on A. If A happens, 
b 
then sell -(1 -b) on B. 
n 
Buy 1 on B. 
Buy 1 on B. 
b 
Sell --
b 
on B. 
1-
a 
Sell -- on A. 
1-a 
Bookie's Utility 
'10 1-Po-b a 
1 -qo 1 -p0 --(l -b) a 
1 - '10 
b 
1 - �o , v 
qo -b 
l-b 
Po a 
l-a 
Table 6: Conditional probability example. 
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Prob(Urn 21White) 
Prob(Urn llBlack) -
Prob(Urn 2IB1ack) -
�q1 + �q2
�q1 
This would lead him to compute the posterior odds Aw against Urn 2 when a white
ball is drawn as 
Aw= Prob(Urn llWhite) = �q1 = �q1; Prob(Urn 21White) �q2 2 q2 
and the posterior odds AB against Urn 2 when a black ball is drawn as
AB= Prob(Urn llBlack) = �q1 = 2q1
Prob(Urn 2IB1ack) �q2 q2 
Thus regardless of what his prior is, a Bayesian bookie will choose a plan of action 
(AB, Aw) satisfying
Aw 1 
Freedman and Purves [5] show that unless a Bookie sets Bayesian posterior odds, he 
will be vulnerable to very weak sort of Dutch book. Suppose the Bookie is not a Bayesian 
and chooses a plan of action (AB, Aw) with f,:' =I �- For example, suppose he sets AB = 3
and Aw = 1. Then consider the following plan of action for the Bettor:
• If a white ball is drawn, bet 750 on Urn 2 and 250 against Urn 2.
• If a black ball is drawn, bet 25 on Urn 2 and 975 against Urn 2.
How would our Bettor expect to fare ex ante? 
• If the MC chooses Urn 1, then with probability � he draws a white ball. In this case
the Bookie posts odds Aw = 1 against Urn 2 (even odds), and the Bettor bets 750
on Urn 2 and 250 against, so the Bettor loses 500. With probability � a black ball
is drawn, the Bookie posts odds AB = 3 against Urn 2, the Bettor bets 25 on Urn 2
and 975 on Urn 1, so he wins -25 + 9;5 = 300. The Bettor's expected winnings are
thus 1g0 > 0.
• If the MC chooses Urn 2, then with probability � he draws a white ball, the Bookie
posts AB = 1 against Urn 2, the Bettor bets 750 on Urn 2 and 250 against, and so
wins 500. With probability �, the MC draws a. black ha.II, the Bookie posts odds
AB = 3 against Urn 2, the Bettor bets 25 on Urn 2 and 975 against, and so loses
- (3 x 25 -975) = 900. The Bettor's expected winnings are again 1g0 > 0.
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With these odds, regardless of which urn is actually chosen, the Bettor expects to make 
money ex ante. Note that he does not make money in all cases. Freedman and Purves [5] 
prove that unless the Bookie uses Bayesian posterior odds for some prior, then such a 
betting strategy always exists. 
This is of course a much weaker Dutch Book than those of the other two possible 
violations of the basic rules of probability theory, as it does not imply that the bookie must 
lose money.6 Nevertheless, even this conclusion fails once the bookie plays strategically. 
It turns out that even if there is only one possible bettor the bookie may find it optimal 
to set rates that do not agree with Bayes' rule, provided the bettor is not an expected 
utility maximizer. 
Suppose that the bookie is an expected value maximizer and the bettor maximizes an 
anticipated utility functional with the concave probability transformation function 
e - e1-P
g(p) = 1 .e-
We have already seen that in that case the bookie's optimal strategy is to set additive 
rates (Theorem 4). Let the bookie's initial beliefs be given by q = (0.25, 0.75) and the 
bettors beliefs are q' = (0.5, 0.5). After observing a white ball their beliefs change to(�, �) and (�, �) , respectively, while after observing a black ball they will change to
c2 �c2 ]' 5' 5) anu J' J , respectively. 
Let the bookie announce the rates (pw, 1-pw) and (PB, 1-pB) after observing a white 
or a black ball, respectively. In the notation of Proposition 3 we obtain aw = 3.343pw, 
fJw = l.230pw, °'B = 0.813pB, and fJB = 0.299PB· Let the bettor's budget constraint be
one dollar. It follows from Proposition 3 that the bettor's optimal strategies are: 
• If the MC draws a white ball, bet a dollar on Urn 1 if pw :::; 0.230 and bet one dollar
on Urn 2 if pw 2': 0.448.
• If the MC draws a black ball, bet a dollar on Urn 1 if PB :::; 0.552 and bet one dollar
on Urn 2 if PB 2': 0.770.
Whatever the bettor decides to do, the bookie would like to set the rate on the event 
upon which the bettor plays to be as high as possible. Therefore, she will set pw to be 
either 0.230 or 0.552, and PB will be either 0.552 or 0.230. Moreover, the rates pw and
6It is impossible to expose the bookie to a Dutch book even if the bettor is allowed to bet on the 
urns before and after the MC draws the ball. Suppose that he first bets one dollar on Urn 1. (There 
is of course no reason to bet on both urns as such a bet yields zero with probability one). If the MC 
chooses Urn 2 and draws a white ball the rates are set by the bookie to be � and �- The bettor must
now bet at least two dollars on Urn 2 to end with a non-negative outcome. However, if the MC chooses 
Urn 1 and draws a white ball this strategy forces the bettor to lose a dollar. 
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PB are set independently. Since the bookie is risk neutral, it is easy to verify that she 
will set the rates pw = 0.230 and PB = 0.552. It is easy to verify that 
PW 
�: = (l ;:w) = 0.242 # 0.25.
(1 -PB) 
In this case, in equilibrium the bookie will announce rates disagreeing with Bayes' rule. 
5 Conclusions
Several recent nonexpected utility models are based on the assumption that decision 
makers do not obey some of the basic rules of probability theory. Fishburn [4], Schmei­
dler [12] , and Gilboa [6] presented models where people use nonadditive probabilities. 
Segal [14] analyses a model where decision makers do not multiply the probabilities in 
a multi-stage lottery. There is evidence that experimental subjects have a tendency to 
violate at least this last rule (see, for example, [10, 8] and the references in [14]). We 
do not claim that the only reason for these violations is that people behave strategically. 
Nor do we want to suggest that the correct interpretation of the above mentioned models 
is game theoretic. However, we believe that these models and empirical evidence cannot 
he rejected as inelevant on the g+ound hllity-U-.F;Y-e�es-tffie------
decision maker to a Dutch book. 
All these models analyze the behavior of a single agent. Dutch books must involve at 
least two agents, therefore the correct framework is game theoretic, and one must assume 
that agents behave strategically. In particular, the subject who appears to be falling for 
a Dutch book mat be strategic. Green [7] presents a Dutch book argument in favor of 
quasi-convex preferences. His argument assumes that the person offering choices to the 
subject is much more sophisticated than the subject. Our approach is more symmmetric 
in that the subject bookie is at least as sophisticated as the bettors. 
Yaari [17] argued against giving too much normative weight to Dutch books, as they 
may lead to the conclusion that only expected value maximization is rational. While we 
do not reject the value of Dutch book arguments, we do reject their usual interpretation. 
It seems to be too strong to conclude from this paper that strategic behavior can 
rationalize all apparent Dutch books. A well known defense of the transitivity axiom is 
based on the following argument. Suppose that a consumer (strictly) prefers A to B, B 
to C, but C to A, and assume that he holds a ticket for A. Offer to trade his ticket on
A and a small sum of money for a ticket on C, then from C to B and back to A, just to
find himself with his initial option less a positive sum of money. One mil!:ht trv to use - - - � � 
the approach of this paper to argue that announcing this nontransitivity may be rational 
provided that the other agent's preferred option is not A, otherwise he will not let the 
nontransitive agent to get back his original option. However, this objection holds only 
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if the other agent cannot induce the consumer to move once more from A to C. But in
that case there is no reason to assume that he will be able to convince him to complete 
even one cycle. 
19 
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